OPINION (UGNEWSLINE) – Uganda’s decentralisation system is at a crossroads. As the country debates proposals to appoint and train a new crop of Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs), Deputy CAOs, Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) and Deputy RDCs, we must ask ourselves a fundamental question: will replacing these officials improve service delivery, or are we overlooking deeper structural problems within government?
In an opinion piece published on September 28, 2026, titled “Let’s Appoint, Train New RDCs and Chief Administrative Officers,” Hon. Moses Byaruhanga, Senior Presidential Advisor on Political Affairs, argued that administrative weaknesses, corruption and staff absenteeism in local governments are linked to failures among current administrative leaders.
His concerns about accountability, integrity and performance in public service are legitimate. Ugandans deserve efficient public institutions, responsible leaders and reliable service delivery. Corruption must be fought, public servants must be held accountable, and absenteeism should never be tolerated.
As the Uganda Local Governments Association (ULGA), we believe that meaningful reform must begin with an honest assessment of the systems, resources and administrative processes that determine how local governments function.
Decentralisation Requires More Than Good Leadership
Uganda’s decentralisation framework, provided for under Chapter Eleven of the 1995 Constitution and the Local Governments Act, was established to transfer political, administrative and fiscal powers closer to the people.
Its purpose was to strengthen local democracy, improve public participation in decision-making and ensure that essential services are delivered according to the needs of communities.
The system depends on three interconnected pillars: political decentralisation, administrative decentralisation and fiscal decentralisation.
Political decentralisation empowers elected local councils to identify priorities and make decisions on behalf of their communities. Administrative decentralisation provides professional public servants, led by CAOs and Town Clerks, to implement council resolutions and government policies. Fiscal decentralisation provides the resources necessary to translate those decisions into services.
These pillars must function together. It is unreasonable to expect local governments to deliver quality education, healthcare, roads, agricultural extension and other essential services when their responsibilities are not matched by adequate funding, staffing and operational support.
A CAO may be competent, committed and experienced, but leadership alone cannot compensate for inadequate resources, delayed recruitment approvals or rigid funding arrangements.
The Funding Gap Undermines Service Delivery
One of the greatest challenges facing local governments is the mismatch between their responsibilities and the resources available to fulfil them.
Local governments are expected to supervise schools, monitor health facilities, maintain community roads, inspect construction projects, support farmers and enforce government standards. Yet much of the money transferred to them is earmarked for specific purposes, particularly salaries, leaving limited funds for daily operations.
For effective service delivery, Uganda should review the proportion of the national budget allocated to local governments and work towards funding levels that reflect their responsibilities and actual operational needs.
Allocations have historically remained around 8 to 10 per cent of the national budget, according to the figures presented in this debate, while local governments require greater financial flexibility to perform their statutory functions effectively.
The problem is not simply the amount allocated. It is also how the money is structured and whether local governments can use it to address their most pressing needs.
Consider a district education officer expected to supervise dozens of schools without reliable transport or fuel. Consider a district health officer who must monitor health facilities, verify staff attendance and follow up medicine stock-outs without adequate facilitation.
How effectively can these officers perform their duties under such circumstances?
The same problem affects engineering departments. A district may receive funding to construct a classroom block, maternity ward or staff house, but the works department may lack transport and operational funds to conduct regular site inspections.
Without consistent supervision, construction defects may go undetected, contractors may take advantage of weak monitoring, and projects may be delayed or completed below the required standards.
Communities ultimately suffer the consequences, while local government leaders are blamed for failures that may partly arise from inadequate operational funding.
This does not excuse negligence or corruption. It demonstrates why accountability must be accompanied by the resources and systems needed to make it effective.
Centralised Processes Delay Local Government Projects
Another major challenge is the lengthy administrative process involved in implementing publicly funded projects.
Local governments may have approved budgets for classrooms, maternity wards, outpatient departments, staff houses and road maintenance. However, implementation can be delayed by procurement requirements, funding releases, technical approvals, legal clearances and other administrative procedures.
A district may identify a pressing need, prepare its procurement plans and begin the process of securing a contractor, only for approvals or funding releases to take several months.
When implementation is delayed, construction may begin during the rainy season or towards the end of the financial year. Contractors may then struggle to complete works on time, request price variations or abandon projects.
The consequences are felt by pupils learning in overcrowded classrooms, patients receiving care in inadequate facilities and communities waiting for essential infrastructure.
It is therefore necessary to examine the entire project implementation chain, including the responsibilities of central government ministries and agencies, rather than placing the entire burden of blame on CAOs and other local administrators.
We must streamline procurement and approval processes, ensure timely release of funds and strengthen coordination between central government and local governments.
Replacing administrators while retaining the same delays will not produce fundamentally different results.
Staffing Shortages Cannot Be Solved Through Transfers Alone
Local governments also face significant staffing challenges.
Approved staffing structures do not automatically give districts the financial authority to recruit every required employee. Recruitment depends on wage ceilings, establishment controls and clearances from the responsible central government institutions.
As a result, districts may have vacant positions that remain unfilled despite the urgent need for additional personnel.
A newly constructed classroom may lack sufficient teachers because recruitment has not been cleared. An upgraded health centre may have inadequate numbers of midwives, laboratory personnel and clinical officers. Engineering departments may be expected to supervise roads, buildings and other infrastructure with very few technical officers.
The same staffing pressures affect internal audit, procurement, community development, natural resources and local administration.
These shortages weaken supervision, delay reporting and limit the ability of local governments to detect and address poor performance.
The Ministry of Public Service, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, and local governments must therefore work together to align staffing establishments, wage ceilings, recruitment approvals and actual service delivery requirements.
Recruitment clearances should be processed promptly, while payroll systems must function efficiently to allow duly appointed employees to access their salaries without unnecessary delays.
The UPE Funding Question Must Be Addressed
The debate about administrative performance should also consider the financial realities facing public primary schools.
The Universal Primary Education capitation grant rate cited in this discussion is Shs20,000 per learner per year.
Divided across three school terms, this amounts to approximately Shs6,667 per learner per term. Assuming an 80-day term, the allocation works out to about Shs83 per learner per school day.
This is a very small amount from which schools are expected to meet various operational needs, including learning materials, examination printing, co-curricular activities, utilities and routine maintenance.
While schools must be held accountable for the proper use of public funds, we cannot ignore the effect of inadequate capitation funding on the quality of education.
The issue of ghost learners must be condemned without reservation. Inflating enrolment figures or misappropriating public funds is unacceptable and must attract appropriate sanctions.
However, eliminating fraud should go hand in hand with reviewing the adequacy of school funding and strengthening verification systems.
We are also concerned about disruptions arising from the withdrawal of parental contributions towards meals and additional teaching support. Parent-Teacher Associations have an important role in supporting school activities through properly agreed and transparent arrangements that comply with government policy.
The wider objective should be to ensure that schools receive adequate and predictable resources while protecting parents and learners from unfair or arbitrary demands.
Why Wage Funds Remain Unspent
The return of unspent wage funds to the Consolidated Fund is another issue frequently cited as evidence of poor performance by CAOs and Town Clerks.
While local accounting officers must be held responsible for funds they fail to utilise through negligence, the circumstances behind unspent balances must be examined before conclusions are drawn.
In some cases, local governments cannot recruit because they are awaiting wage clearance or permission from the Ministry of Public Service. District Service Commission processes may also take time, while payroll onboarding and validation challenges can delay the deployment of newly appointed staff.
Where recruitment approvals are issued late in the financial year, local governments may have insufficient time to complete recruitment and payroll processes before the June 30 financial year-end.
Consequently, money initially provided for salaries may remain unspent and be returned to the central treasury.
Such cases call for closer examination of the entire recruitment and payroll process, not automatic conclusions that local government leaders have failed.
Government should identify where delays occur, establish clear timelines for approvals and ensure that recruitment and payroll systems operate efficiently.
At the same time, local governments must improve recruitment planning, maintain accurate staffing records and act promptly whenever approvals are granted.
Why a Wholesale Replacement of CAOs and RDCs Is Risky
The proposal to replace existing CAOs, Deputy CAOs, RDCs and Deputy RDCs with a new crop of officials may appear attractive as a quick response to concerns about accountability.
However, a wholesale replacement without structural reform risks creating more problems than it solves.
First, it could lead to the loss of institutional memory. Experienced administrators possess knowledge of district development plans, ongoing projects, financial commitments, staffing challenges and relationships with communities and development partners. Removing them indiscriminately could disrupt ongoing programmes and weaken administrative continuity.
Second, new officers would face many of the same challenges as their predecessors. They would still have to operate within existing budget ceilings, recruitment procedures, procurement requirements and funding arrangements. Without reforms to these systems, there is little reason to expect a new group of officials to achieve substantially different results.
Third, a blanket approach risks penalising competent and hardworking officers alongside those whose performance may be unsatisfactory. Public service reform should distinguish between individuals who deliver results and those who fail to meet their obligations.
Fourth, the debate must respect Uganda’s decentralised governance framework and the role of elected local leaders. District chairpersons, councillors and other elected representatives have a constitutional and statutory responsibility to participate in determining local priorities and overseeing service delivery.
Reforms should strengthen cooperation between elected leaders and appointed administrators rather than undermine the institutions through which citizens participate in local governance.
Our position is not that existing CAOs, Town Clerks or RDCs should be shielded from scrutiny. Any officer involved in corruption, persistent absenteeism, negligence or deliberate failure to perform must be investigated and held accountable under established laws and procedures.
What we oppose is the assumption that changing personnel, on its own, will resolve systemic weaknesses.
What Should Be Done Instead?
Uganda needs a comprehensive reform agenda that addresses both individual performance and institutional constraints.
First, improve funding for local governments. Government should progressively increase intergovernmental fiscal transfers in line with the responsibilities assigned to local governments. Particular attention should be given to operational funding for supervision, monitoring, infrastructure maintenance, primary healthcare and education.
Second, streamline recruitment and payroll processes. The Ministry of Public Service and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development should work with local governments to reduce delays in recruitment clearances, wage approvals and payroll onboarding. Timely decisions would enable districts to fill essential vacancies and use approved wage allocations effectively.
Third, reform project implementation procedures. Government should review procurement and approval processes that unnecessarily delay local infrastructure projects. Clear timelines, stronger coordination and timely releases of funds would help local governments implement projects within the financial year and improve value for money.
Fourth, strengthen accountability mechanisms. Internal audit, council oversight, performance assessments and administrative disciplinary procedures should be strengthened. Officers should be evaluated against measurable responsibilities, with sanctions for proven misconduct and recognition for outstanding performance.
Fifth, invest in continuous professional development. CAOs, Town Clerks, RDCs and other public officers need regular training in public financial management, procurement, leadership, supervision, integrity and results-based management. Capacity building should be continuous rather than limited to periodic recruitment exercises.
Sixth, build the capacity of elected leaders. District chairpersons and Local Council III leaders need continuous training in governance, oversight, planning and public accountability. Appropriate leadership and ideological orientation, including through the National Leadership Institute where suitable, can help elected leaders understand their responsibilities and work more effectively with technical officers.
Seventh, assess existing administrators fairly. Government should undertake a transparent, evidence-based assessment of the current crop of CAOs, Town Clerks and RDCs. Those who perform well should be supported, while those who fail to meet established standards should be subjected to corrective measures or disciplinary action in accordance with the applicable laws and procedures.
This approach would allow government to identify genuine performance gaps without disrupting institutions unnecessarily.
Conclusion: Fix the System, Strengthen Accountability
Uganda’s decentralisation system remains an important instrument for bringing public services closer to citizens. Its success, however, depends on whether the responsibilities assigned to local governments are matched by adequate funding, staffing, administrative support and decision-making authority.
The concerns raised by Hon. Moses Byaruhanga about corruption, absenteeism and administrative laxity deserve serious attention. But the response must be informed by evidence and a clear understanding of the conditions under which local governments operate.
A change of personnel may be necessary where individual performance has failed. It cannot, however, substitute for reforms to funding, recruitment, procurement, payroll administration and institutional accountability.
The real test of reform is not how many administrators are replaced, but whether schools receive better support, health facilities are adequately staffed, roads are maintained, public projects are completed on time and citizens obtain better services.
As the Uganda Local Governments Association, we call on government and all stakeholders to move beyond a debate centred solely on replacing CAOs and RDCs. Let us build a system that provides local governments with the resources and authority necessary to perform, while holding every public officer accountable for their decisions and results.
Uganda does not simply need new administrators. It needs a decentralisation system that enables competent administrators to deliver, identifies underperformance fairly and ensures that public resources translate into better services for the people.
By Richard Okuku, Secretary General, Uganda Local Governments Association (ULGA)
